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We  investigate  whether  replicator  dynamics  justify “survival  of the  fittest”  when 
players  inherit  pure  strategies,  mixed  strategies,  or  rules  for  choosing  strategies.  A 
strategy  that  never  is  a  best  reply  can  survive  replicator  dynamics  if only  pure 
strategies  are  heritable,  but  only  rationalizable  strategies survive  if mixed  strategies 
are  heritable.  Now  suppose  agents can  inherit  the  rule  of choosing  a  best reply  to 
the  last period’s  population,  rather  than  inheriting  a strategy itself. Such  optimizers 
need  not  drive  out  players  who  inherit  a  dominated  strategy.  If  we  interpret 
replicator  dynamics  as a learning  process, this  means that  non-optimizing  behavior 
can  survive. Journal  of Economic  Literature  Classification  Number:  C73.  ir  1992 
Academic  Press.  Inc. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  investigates  the  evolutionary  justification  for  “survival  of the 
fittest.”  We  provide  an  example  where  a strategy  that  is  not  fittest  against 
any  population,  a  “never-fittest  strategy,”  survices.  We  discuss  two  inter- 
pretations  of  this  result:  the  biological  interpretation  that  evolution  need 
not  select  the  fittest,  and  the  economic  interpretation  that  evolution  may 
fail  to  select  for  rationality. 
We  model  evolution  using  replicator  dynamics,  which  are  based  on  the 
following  biological  model.  In  each  generation  each  player  is  randomly 
matched  with  an  opponent  and  they  play  a  one-shot  normal-form  game 
where  payoffs  represent  numbers  of offspring.  Each  offspring  inherits  from 
its  parent  a rule  that  determines  its  strategy  in  the  game,  so successful rules 
proliferate. 
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Evolutionary  models  have  typically  restricted  attention  to  very  simple 
heritable  rules,  of the  form  “play  s,”  where  s is a pure  strategy  in  the  game. 
Recently  some  authors  (Hines  [14,  151,  Zeeman  [28],  van  Damme  [7], 
and  Robson  [24])  have  assumed  that  players  can  inherit  mixed  strategies 
as well.  In  addition  to  considering  these  two  cases, we introduce  a broader 
perspective:  Players  can  inherit  rules  that  determine  strategies  in  the  one- 
shot  game  as a function  of the  history  of play  (as in  learning  models).’  In 
addition  to  broadening  the  scope  of evolutionary  models,  this  should  allow 
one  to  extend  the  focus  of  learning  models.  These  models  typically  ask 
what  strategies  result  from  exogenously  given  learning  rules.  Allowing  for 
heritable  rules  can  endogenize  the  determination  of rules  and  can  model 
which  rules  survive.* 
The  outcome  of evolution  depends  on  what  is  heritable.  In  Section  2 we 
show by  example  that  if  players  inherit  pure  strategies,  then  never-fittest 
strategies  can  survive  evolutionary  forces.  On  the  other  hand,  we show in 
Proposition  2  that  if  players  inherit  mixed  strategies,  then  never-fittest 
strategies  will  become  extinct.  In  Section  3  we assume  that  some  players 
inherit  a  never-fittest  strategy  while  others  choose  best  replies  to  last 
period’s  population.  Although  naive,  this  rule  seems  more  complex  and 
rational  than  simply  inheriting  strategies.  Nevertheless  we show by  example 
that  if fails  to  drive  out  the  never-fittest  strategy. 
It  turns  out  that  our  first  example  relies  on  discrete  time  dynamics. 
Samuelson  and  Zhang  [26]  show that  in  continuous  time  the  replicator 
dynamics  with  heritable  pure  strategies  extinguish  never-fittest  strategies.3 
Cabrales  and  Sobel  [S]  provide  an  informative  reconciliation  of our  results 
with  theirs,  and  develop  sufficient  conditions  (analogues  to  conditions 
provided  by  Samuelson  and  Zhang  [26])  under  which  discrete  time 
dynamics  extinguish  never-fittest  strategies. 
The  biological  interpretation  of our  results  is  clear:  Evolution  does  not 
guarantee  “survival  of the  fittest”  since,  when  the  fittest  strategy  depends  on 
’ One  could  also  consider  the  opposite  approach.  Whereas  we  allow  players  to  inherit  more 
complicated  objects  than  just  pure  strategies,  one  might  want  to  restrict  attention  to  players 
who  can  inherit  only  a  strict  subset  of  the  set  of  pure  strategies.  This  seems  most  natural  when 
the  one-shot  game  is  complicated,  e.g.,  if  it  itself  is  an  extensive  form  game.  In  interesting 
models  of  evolution  of  play  in  infinitely-repeated  games,  Binmore  and  Samuelson  [3]  and 
Fudenberg  and  Maskin  [12]  assume  that  the  only  heritable  strategies  are  those  that  can  be 
played  by  finite  automata. 
*Of  course,  the  process  selecting  among  rules,  namely  the  replicator  dynamics,  is 
exogenous.  Thus,  we  only  move  the  exogenous  assumption  one  step  back. 
3 Our  example  in  Section  3  does  not  have  a  continuous  time  analog,  since  some  players 
form  beliefs  based  on  play  in  the  immediately  preceding  period.  However  we  can  ask  what 
happens  in  the  limit,  as  the  time  period  is  made  short  (as  in  Cabrales  and  Sobel  [S]).  In  this 
example,  making  the  time  period  short  does  not  effect  our  result:  the  never-fittest  strategies 
survive  regardless  of  the  time  period. 394  DEKELANDSCOTCHMER 
what  other  agents  are  doing,  a  never-fittest  strategy  might  survive.  This 
failure  is  distinct  from,  and  possibly  more  severe  than,  a  failure  discussed 
in  the  biology  literature,  that  evolution  selects for  local,  not  global,  optima. 
The  economics  interpretation  of the  model  is  less straightforward.  If  the 
payoffs  in  the  game  are  interpreted  as utility  payoffs,  then  we have  shown 
how strategies  that  never  are  best  replies  can  survive.  Thus,  evolution  fails 
to  imply  that  people  play  “as  if’  rational  since,  whatever  their  beliefs, 
rational  players  would  only  choose  best  replies. 
However,  the  motivation  for  replicator  dynamics  relies  on  the  idea  that 
payoffs  represent  reproductive  success, not  utility.  There  are  two  routes  to 
justifying  the  economics  interpretation.  The  simplest  is  to  identify  utility 
with  fitness  payoffs:  assume  that  higher  utility  coincides  with  more 
children,  and  each  Chile  inherits  (either  genetically,  or  by  learning)  its 
strategy  or  rule  for  choosing  a  strategy  from  its  parent.  Emulation  of 
parents  might  be  plausible  in  complex  environments,  as  when  children 
follow  in  their  parents’  footsteps.  A  second  way  to justify  payoffs  as utility 
is  based  on  the  view that  replicator  dynamics  are  a model  of learning  with 
bounded  rationality.  While  popular,  this  justification  has  not  yet  been  for- 
malized,  and  such  a  formalization  lies  outside  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  useful  to  identify  the  features  of replicator  dynamics  that 
the  learning  process  must  obey:  the  dynamic  path  shifts  weight  toward 
better-than-average  strategies  even  if they  are  not  best  replies;  worse-than- 
average  strategies  are  not  totally  abandoned;  and  best  replies  might  change 
along  the  dynamic  path  (so the  path  need  not  converge  to  a  steady  state). 
While  we do  not  provide  a  learning  model  with  these  features,  we feel that 
they  are  sufficiently  plausible  to  justify  the  economics  interpretation  of our 
results:  rational  choice  (in  the  sense of choosing  best  replies)  is not  easily 
justified  as  the  outcome  of  evolutionary  dynamics  or  as  the  limit  of 
boundedly  rational  learning. 
2.  BETTER-THAN-AVERAGE  STRATEGIES  VERSUS  BEST  STRATEGIES 
We  begin  by  describing  replicator  dynamics,  then  present  our  example  in 
which  a  strategy  that  never  is  a  best  reply  survives,  and  conclude  this 
section  with  our  positive  result:  when  mixed  strategies  are  heritable, 
nonrationalizable  strategies  (as defined  by  Bernheim  [2]  and  Pearce  [23]) 
will  vanish. 
Consider  a  symmetric  game  with  pure  strategies  described  by  the  set 
s=  { 1, .  ..) n},  and  payoffs  given  by  the  matrix  ZZ=  (xii)‘,  ,,TS1.  That  is,  if 
player  1 plays  pure  strategy  i  and  player  2  plays  pure  strategy  j,  then  the 
payoffs  are  7cV  to  player  1, and  nji  to  player  2. We  will  let  C,  with  generic 
element  o’, be  the  simplex  that  represents  mixed  strategies.  We  will  let  ei EVOLUTION  AND  OPTIMIZING  BEHAVIOR  395 
represent  the  ith  vertex  of L’,  and  will  refer  to  the  distribution  of strategies 
in  period  t  as  cr’,  so  that  the  proportion  of  people  playing  strategy  i  in 
period  t is  rr:. 
Assume  that  people  play  pure  strategies,  players  (asexually)  reproduce 
(without  mutations)  according  to  rrV and  players  are randomly  paired  from 
the  population,  which  involves  a  continuum  of people.  These  assumptions 
motivate  the  following  replicator  dynamics:4 
a:+  ‘/CT: =  (ei.  Z7.a’)/(a’.  Z7.d).  (1) 
It  is  convenient  to  define  the  function  f:  2  -+ Z  that  describes  the  dynamic 
path  determined  by  Eq.  (1)  f(cr’)  =  off’.  Typically  the  initial  distribution, 
o”,  is  assumed  to  assign  strictly  positive  weight  to  all  heritable  strategies. 
This  captures  the  idea  that  mutations  may  introduce  any  strategy  (cp >  0 
for  all  i),  and  that  mutations  are  rare  relative  to  the  adjustment  time  of the 
dynamic  process  (so that  mutations  at  any  time  t are  not  modeled).’  In  the 
replicator  dynamics,  if strategy  i does better  than  the  population  average  in 
period  t,  so  that  (ei  Z7.o’)  >  (a’  .ZZ. a’),  then  strategy  i  becomes  more 
prevalent.  The  best  reply  to  the  population  average  (i.e.,  the  fittest  strategy 
in  any  given  period)  will  have  the  highest  rate  of  growth,  since  the 
numerator  in  (1)  is  largest  for  the  strategy  that  is  a best  reply.  However, 
other  strategies  may  also  grow,  provided  they  are  better  than  average. 
EXAMPLE  1.  Now  we provide  an  example  with  four  strategies  A,  B,  C, 
and  D.  The  proportions  of people  playing  these  strategies  (i.e.,  population 
distributions)  are  denoted  by  0 =  (~1,  B, y, 6). The  payoffs  are  chosen  so that 
for  any  population  distribution  0  there  is a strategy  (A,  B,  or  C)  that  does 
better  than  D  does  against  G.  We  will  show  that,  even  though  there  is 
always  a  rule  in  the  population  that  grows  faster  than  the  rule  “play  D," 
dynamic  paths  from  a  generic  set  of  initial  populations  do  not  have  the 
property  that  6 converges  to  zero. 
The  example  augments  a rock-scissors-paper  game  by  adding  a strategy 
D  that  is not  a  best  reply  to  any  mixed  or  pure  strategy. 
ABCD 
A  1  2.35  0  0.1 
II=  B  0  1  2.35  0.1 
C  2.35  0  1  0.1 
D  1.1  1.1  1.1  0 
4 For  more  discussion  of these dynamics  see, for  example,  van  Damme  [7],  Friedman  [9], 
and  Nachbar  [22]. 
5 Some  recent  papers  assume  that  mutations  can  occur  along  the  dynamics  path  as well  as 
initially,  see, for  example,  Foster  and  Young  [S]  and  Kandori,  Mailath,  and  Rob  [20]. 396  DEKELANDSCOTCHMER 
Strategy  D  survives  because,  under  replicator  dynamics,  it  proliferates  if 
it  does  better  than  the  current  population  average,  even  when  it  is  not  a 
best  reply  to  the  current  population,  or,  in  fact,  to  any  population.  An 
intuitive  argument  is as follows.  A  dynamic  path,  beginning  from  any  point 
where  6 =  0,  except  where  CI  =  /I  =  y =  l/3,  will  spiral  outward,  approaching 
the  boundary.  This  follows  from  well-known  properties  of  rock-scissors- 
paper  games;  for  appropriate  payoffs  the  discrete  dynamics  diverge  (Hof- 
bauer  and  Sigmund  [ 171).  Intuitively,  therefore,  if  6’  becomes  small  and 
the  path  approaches  any  point  where  6 =0  except  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3,0),  the 
dynamic  path  will  spiral  out.  Now,  as  the  path  spirals  close  to  the 
boundary  the  strategy  that  is  a  best  reply  changes,  but  whichever  it  is 
(A, B,  or  C),  it  is scarce. Hence  it  constitutes  a small  part  of the  population 
average.  Thus  D  can  be  better  than  average  even  though  it  is  not  a  best 
reply.  Simple  calculations  show  that,  in  fact,  it  is  better  than  average. 
Hence  6’  is growing,  conflicting  with  the  premise  that  it  converges  to  zero.6 
The  only  other  possibility  is  for  the  path  to  converge  to  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3,0). 
But  the  only  way  to  get  there  is from  a  path  along  which  a’ =  fl’  =  y’. 
PROPOSITION  1.  In Example 1, a dynamic path beginning at (cl’, so, y”,  ho), 
with  6’ > 0, has 6’ converging to  zero if  and only  if  a0 = a0 = y”. 
Proof  Let  Co  be  the  face of the  simplex  where  6 =  0, Co =  ((IX, b, y, 6)  : 
(a,  p, y, 8)~  C,  6 =O).  Let  L  be the  line  in  the  simplex  where  the  first  three 
strategies  get  equal  weight:  L =  { (CI,  /I, y, 6) E Z  : M = /3  = y }.  These  two  sets 
are  shown  in  Fig.  1. 
6=1 
FIGURE  1 
6 In  the  matrix  Ii’  the  payoff  to  playing  C  against  A  is  2.35.  This  payoff  must  be  strictly 
greater  than  2.3  for  D  never  to  be  a  best  reply,  and  it  must  be  strictly  less  than  2.4  for  D  to 
be  better  than  the  population  average  for  any  population  near  the  boundary.  The  last  condi- 
tion  is  not  necessary-for  example,  the  result  holds  with  the  payoff  of  2.Gbut  it  simplifies 
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Only  Zf:  We  prove  the  result  using  the  following  steps. 
1.  If  6’  converges  to  zero,  then  either  the  boundary  of C,  contains  an 
accumulation  point  of  the  dynamic  path  or  (a’,  fir, y’)  converges  to 
(l/3,  l/3,  l/3). 
2.  If  the  dynamic  path  has  an  accumulation  point  on  the  boundary 
of ,X0,  then  6’  does  not  converge  to  zero. 
3a.  If  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3,  0)  is  an  accumulation  point  of a  path,  then  the 
path  lies  in  L  for  all  t  sufficiently  large. 
3b.  If  gT E L,  then  for  all  t,  cr’ E L. 
Therefore  a  dynamic  path  that  starts  anywhere  in  C  except  on  the  line 
L  cannot  have  6’  converging  to  zero.  Further,  if any  point  of a  path  is  on 
L,  the  entire  path  is on  L. 
The  first  step  follows  from  a basic  result  on  continuous  dynamic  systems 
(see Arrowsmith  and  Place  [ 1, p. 171):  Let  G” be an  accumulation  point  of 
a  given  dynamic  path,  say  {o’},  and  suppose  G’  is  an  accumulation  point 
on  a dynamic  path  that  starts  at  a”.  Then  0’  is  also  an  accumulation  point 
of the  dynamic  path  {a’}.  (This  result  follows  from  continuity  of the  map 
that  defines  the  replicator  dynamics.)  Consider  now  a dynamic  path  {a’} 
with  6’ -+  0.  It  follows  from  compactness  that  {(r’}  has  an  accumulation 
point  in  .X0.  As mentioned  above  (see Hofbauer  and  Sigmund  [ 17]),  the 
dynamic  path  starting  from  any  point  in  ,X0 other  than  the  center  has  an 
accumulation  point  on  the  boundary.  Thus,  using  the  basic  result  on  con- 
tinuous  dynamic  systems,  if  {a’}  does not  have  an  accumulation  point  only 
at  the  center,  then  it  has  an  accumulation  point  on  the  boundary. 
For  the  proof  of  step  2  it  is  helpful  to  think  of the  dynamic  path  given 
by  p’=  (q5’, St),  where  qY=  CI’ . B’.  y’.  See  Fig.  2.  The  proof  involves  three 
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(i)  There  exists  a  closed  ball  with  non  empty  interior,  B  c  [0,  1  ]  x 
[0,  11,  that  includes  the  origin,  such  that  for  all  Q’E  B,  &+I  ~4’  and 
6’+  ’ >  6’.  This  is  proved  ‘as follows.  For  points  in  the  interior  of the  sim- 
plex  where  #>O  and  6~0,  $‘+‘/#=  [Xi=.,,,  (e,.n.o’)]/(o’.n.o’)‘. 
This  is  a continuous  function  which  is  bounded  below  one  for  all  points  (T 
on  the  boundary  of  ZO.  Therefore,  in  a  neighborhood,  G,  near  the 
boundary  of ZO,  d’+  i/d’  <  k  where  k  <  1. Similarly,  since  D  is better  than 
the  population  average  for  all  populations  on  the  boundary  of .ZO, there  is 
a  neighborhood,  H,  of  the  origin  for  which  6’+  l/b’  >  p  where  p >  1. The 
desired  B  is  given  by  G n  H. 
(ii)  Choose  # >O  and  S >O  such  that:  (a)  the  set  M  defined  by 
[0,  41 x  [0,  $1  is a subset  of B;  and  (b)  4’  <  4  for  infinitely  many  t. We  can 
satisfy  (b)  because  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  dynamic  path  has  an 
accumulation  point  on  the  boundary  of C,. 
(iii)  If  dT<  4  and  dT<  4,  then  there  exists  S’ >  0 and  t >  T  such  that 
6’>  6’.  If  pr  is  in  M  for  all  t  >  T,  then,  since  M  c  B,  6’  is  increasing  and 
converges  to  some  6*  >  0.  If pr  leaves  M,  it  must  do  so with  6’  going  above 
4.  Otherwise  the  path  would  violate  the  condition  that,  within  B,  q4 is 
decreasing  and  6 is  increasing.  To  conclude,  let  6’ =  max{  6*,  6 }. 
Thus  we  have  shown  that,  when  {cr’}  gets  sufficiently  close  to  the 
boundary  of L’,,  6’  cannot  remain  small.  Together  with  step  1, this  implies 
that  for  6  to  converge  to  0,  the  dynamic  path  must  be  converging  to  the 
unique  Nash  equilibrium,  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3,0).  But  step 3  below  implies  that 
only  paths  starting  from  the  line  L  will  converge  to  the  Nash  equilibrium. 
The  proof  of  step  3a  relies  on  the  Invariant  Manifolds  Theorem 
(Arrowsmith  and  Place  [l,  p. 681).  To  apply  this  theorem,  we recall  that 
the  space  (domain  and  range)  of a  linear  hyperbolic  system  has  a  direct 
sum  decomposition  into  stable  and  unstable  invariant  manifolds 
(Arrowsmith  and  Place  [ 1, p. 64]),  whose dimensions  sum  to  the  dimension 
of the  space. (A  hyperbolic  fixed  point  is one  at  which  no  eigenvalues  of the 
Jacobian  Df  have  modulus  equal  to  one.  The  stable  invariant  manifold  is 
the  union  of all  convergent  dynamic  paths.  The  unstable  invariant  manifold 
is  the  union  of  all  nonconvergent  paths  for  which  the  inverse  path  con- 
verges.)  The  Invariant  Manifold  Theorem  allows  us to  study  the  behavior 
of  a  nonlinear  dynamical  system  in  a  neighborhood  of a  hyperbolic  fixed 
point  g  by  studying  the  stable  and  unstable  manifolds  of its  linearization, 
Of,,  at  that  point:  The  locally  stable  and  unstable  invariant  manifolds  of 
the  nonlinear  system  have  the  same  dimensions  as  those  of  the  linear 
system.  In  the  nonlinear  system,  the  line  L  is a  stable  invariant  set and  C, 
is an  unstable  invariant  set. Since  the  dimensions  sum  to  the  dimension  of 
the  space,  namely  R3,  the  stable  invariant  manifold  has dimension  one,  and 
is  therefore  L:  The  only  paths  that  converge  lie  entirely  on  L. EVOLUTION  AND  OPTIMIZING  BEHAVIOR  399 
Since  the  replicator  dynamics  system  turns  out  to  be  hyperbolic  at 
cr  =  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3,0),  this  completes  the  argument  for  step  3a.  Step  3b 
claims  that  if a  path  begins  on  L  it  stays on  L,  and  points  on  L  can  only 
be  reached  from  L.  The  first  claim  can  be seen directly  from  the  replicator 
dynamics,  Eq.  (1).  The  second  claim  follows  from  a  straightforward 
application  of  the  inverse  function  theorem:  f  is  invertible  starting  at  any 
point  on  L,  and  can  therefore  be reached  from  only  one  point,  which  must 
also  lie  on  L. 
ZJ  We  have  already  argued  that  a path  that  begins  on  L  stays  on  L.  It 
follows  from  the  replicator  dynamics  in  Eq.  (1)  that  6 is strictly  decreasing 
when  the  distribution  of  strategies  starts  on  the  line  L.  Therefore,  such  a 
path  has  a limit  point,  and  the  limit  point  is  a Nash  equilibrium  (see, e.g., 
Nachbar  [22]).  Hence  the  limit  point  is (l/3,  l/3,  l/3,0).  Q.E.D. 
We  now  develop  the  positive  result  for  the  case  of  heritable  mixed 
strategies.  If  a  strategy  is  never  a  best  reply,  then  there  is  some  (possibly 
mixed)  strategy  that  does  better  against  every  population  (Pearce  [23]). 
Individuals  playing  strategies  in  a  neighborhood  of  this  dominating 
strategy  will  replicate  faster  than,  and  hence  drive  to  extinction,  those 
individuals  who  play  the  dominated  strategy.  If  only  pure  strategies  can  be 
inherited,  as in  the  above  example,  then,  whenever  the  dominating  strategy 
is  a  mixed  strategy,  the  dominating  strategy  will  not  be  played  by  any 
person  in  the  population;  thus  the  previous  argument  could  not  be applied. 
To  develop  the  argument,  we need  some  additional  notation.  Previously 
we used  the  vector  G E C  to  represent  the  distribution  of pure  strategies  in 
the  population,  We  now assume  individuals  can  play  mixed  strategies  (T E C 
themselves,  and  we need  another  notion-a  distribution  on  C-to  describe 
the  distribution  of mixed  strategies  in  the  population.  We  will  let  0  c  2’  be 
the  Bore1  field  of mixed  strategies  in  C,  with  generic  elements  denoted  by 
8. We  will  let  d(C)  be the  set of probability  measures  on  the  Bore1 field  of 
C,  with  generic  element  cc.  The  probability  measure  pf E d(C)  represents  the 
distribution  of mixed  strategies  in  the  population  at  time  t,  and  ~~(0)  is the 
proportion  of the  population  playing  mixed  strategies  in  8 E 0. 
To  describe  the  replicator  dynamics  with  mixed-strategy  inheritance,  we 
need  notation  for  the  average  strategy  played  by  players  whose  strategies 
lie  in  a  particular  subset  B of C.  This  average  depends  on  p,  and  is  given 
by  the  function  T : d(C)  x 0  +  Z,  where  t(p,  0) =  Jase  0 &/p(8).  The 
weight  assigned  to  pure  strategy  j  by  s(p,  0)  is then  z#,  f3). The  replicator 
dynamics  are  given  by  the  following  equation,  where  8  is  a  measurable 
subset  of 5 
p,+ l(e)  = cw  0) .n+,  ai 
[TOJ’,  Z)  .  z7.  T($,  C)]  .  /-Qe).  (2) 
It  is  easy  to  verify  that  if p’~d(C)  then  p’+i  EA(Z). 400  DEKELAND  SCOTCHMER 
With  this  definition  of  the  replicator  dynamics,  we  now  can  state  the 
result.’  The  next  proposition  states  that  for  large  t,  the  population  will,  in 
aggregate,  play  dominated  strategies  with  arbitrarily  small  probability. 
PROPOSITION  2.  Suppose  that pure strategy  j  is never a best reply,  so that 
it  is dominated by  a (possibly mixed)  strategy  6 that  assigns  zero probability 
to strategy  j.  Then, if  pO has  full  support, lim,_  Lo  z,(p’,  L’)  =  0. 
Proof  We  will  first  show that  for  sufficiently  large  t  and  for  +  >  0,  the 
dynamic  path  assigns  arbitrarily  small  weight  to  the  set of mixed  strategies 
with  aj >  $,  or  almost  all  its  weight  to  the  subset  of mixed  strategies  with 
o, <  $.  Since  this  is  true  for  any  Ic/  E (0,  11,  the  replicator  dynamics  remove 
population  weight  from  strategies  that  place  positive  weight  on  strategy  j. 
See Fig.  3. 
We  need  to  define  a  function  r  that  “replaces  pure  strategy  j  with  6  in 
each  strategy  a.”  This  function  is  given  by  r(a)  =  G -  ojej  +  a,&.  The  proof 
of the  following  claim  is  straightforward,  hence  omitted. 
Claim  1.  If  strategy  j  is  strongly  dominated  by  5,  then  for  any  0  such 
that  aj >  0,  CJ  is  strongly  dominated  by  r(o). 
Choose  II/,  0 <  1,9  d  1.  Partition  C  into  two  subsets,  CA  and  ZB,  where 
‘zB=(oEC:oj<l//)  and  CA  is  its  complement.  We  will  define  a function 
N:  C x (0,  1) +  C  to  describe  neighbourhoods:  N(a,  A) =  (6’  E C  : for  all 
i E S,  10; -  ail  <  A},  i.e.,  it  is  the  i  open  ball  around  e  under  the  sup  norm. 
Claim  2.  There  exists  1,  0 <  J. <  $,  such  that  for  any  IJ E .ZA and  any 
5 E N(a,  A) A ,ZA, 5 is dominated  by  r(a).  The  claim  follows  from  continuity 
FIGURE 3 
’  The  replicator  dynamics  given  in  Eq.  (2)  coincide  with  the  dynamics  for  heritable  mixed 
strategies  proposed  by  Hines  [14,  151  and  Zeeman  [28],  although  Zeeman  restricts  attention 
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of  the  payoffs  and  of  the  function  r,  and  the  fact  that  CA  is  compact. 
(Clearly  L depends  on  1,9,  but  we do  not  write  this  explicitly  for  notational 
simplicity.) 
Claim  3.  Using  Claim  2, continuity,  and  compactness,  there  exists  q >  0 
such  that  given  any  GEL”,  for  all  c+ E N(a,  2) n  CA  and  for  all 
d E N( r(a),  q) A Z*,  B  dominates  g’. 
Claim  4.  Using  compactness  of  CA,  there  is  a  finite  number  of 
strategies  {g’}y1”1  in  CA,  such that  the  union  of the  neighborhoods  N(a’,  ;1) 
contains  CA. 
Claim  5.  For  each  o  >O,  there  exists  T,  such  that  p’(N(a’,  A))/ 
h’(N(r(o’),  r]) <w  for  all  t >  T,,  and  all  i. 
Proof  of  Claim  5.  The  replicator  dynamics  imply  Eq.  (3)  below. 
)Ld+ ‘(N(a’,  A))  /oNa’,  A)) 
P’+w(r(d,  v))  =  ,eNr(d,  rl)) 
T($,  N(o’,  1)).  n.  T($,  2) 
’ T(P’,  N(r(a’),  ?))  . n.  T(P’,  c)’ 
(3) 
We  show  that  the  rightmost  fraction  in  (3)  is  bounded  above  by  some 
&<  1. 
r(p’, N(a’, A.))  . n. T($, Z)  U.17.T 
T(p',  N(r(U'),  Yf)).n.T($,  c) 
=- 
t7'qn.T' 
where  0 E N(a’,  A),  and  (T’ E N(r(a’),  q),  by  the  mean  value  theorem.  By 
Claim  3,  the  right-hand  side  equals  some  E <  1. Thus,  the  weight  on  the 
neighborhood  of 0’  is  decreasing  at  a rate  bounded  below  one,  relative  to 
the  weight  on  the  neighborhood  of  r(oi).  This  completes  the  proof  of 
Claim  5, 
Hence, 
p’(C”) < zi p’(N(d, A))  < ci  PW(~‘>  A))  <n(n)  w 
/-4Nr(d  v))  ’  ’ 
for  t>T,. 
In  the  argument  above  we can  choose  II/ ‘as small  as  we like,  and  for  any 
$,  we can  choose  n(L)  -w as small  as  we like.  Thus:  zj(p’,  Z)  <  p’(Z”)  + 
II/ . pr(CB)  <  n(L).  o  +  $,  which  we can  make  as small  as we like.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition  2  assumed  that  p.  has  full  support,  and  therefore  that  there 
is  a  continuum  of  players.  A  similar  theorem  can  be  proven  for  finite 402  DEKEL  AND  SCOTCHMER 
populations  which  inevitably  have  initial  distributions  with  finite  support.’ 
In  particular,  assume  that  finitely  many  players,  say  m,  are  drawn  at 
random  according  to  some  distribution,  ji  E d(C),  with  full  support.  This 
draw determines  an  initial  distribution,  pO, with  m  elements  in  its  support. 
Suppose  that  the  population  evolves  according  to  replicator  dynamics.  For 
any  u >  0,  if m is large  enough,  then,  if the  population  evolves  according  to 
replicator  dynamics,  with  probability  1 -u  the  weight  on  a  never-fittest 
strategy  is eventually  less than  u. The  proof  follows  the  same  lines  as above: 
For  any  $,  if m  is large,  then,  with  high  probability,  the  initial  distribution 
will  include  strategies  belonging  to  all  of  the  “dominating  sets,” 
N(r(a’),  r/), .  .  .  . N(r(a”‘“’  ), q),  referred  to  in  Claims  2-4. 
Thus,  after  a  sufficiently  long  time  T,,  any  dominated  strategy  is played 
with  arbitrarily  small  probability.  We  can  apply  the  same  reasoning  to 
assert that  after  a sufficiently  long  time,  say T, the  population  weight  on  all 
dominated  strategies  will  be  less  than  any  given  E >  0.  Now  consider  a 
strategy  k  that  is  strictly  dominated  in  the  game  that  would  remain  if we 
had  gone  through  some  rounds  of  entirely  deleting  dominated  strategies. 
Lemma  1 below  asserts that  there  is a mixed  strategy,  c’,  that  does  strictly 
better  than  k  against  any  belief  over  opponents’  strategies  (i.e.,  against  any 
population  distribution)  that  assigns  probability  less than  a  small  enough 
E  to  those  strategies  that  were  deleted.  The  proof  is  straightforward:  By 
hypothesis  k  is dominated  in  the  game  where  some  strategies  were deleted, 
so the  statement  is true  for  E =  0;  by  continuity  of payoffs  and  finiteness  of 
the  game  we  can  find  a  strictly  positive  E  that  works  for  all  possible 
strategies  k,  and  all  possible  deletions. 
LEMMA  1.  Given  a  game  with  strategy  space  S  and  payoffs  IT,  there 
exists  E >  0  such  that  the following  is  true.  Suppose  strategy  k  is  strongly 
dominated  in  the game  with  strategy  space  S’  and payoffs  IIs,  where  S’ c  S, 
and  17,.  is  the payoff  matrix  II  restricted  to  S’.  Then,  there  exists  o’ E C  such 
that  (a’.ZT.o)>  (e,.ZT.a)  for  all  CTEC  such  that  ZieS-s,oi<~. 
Therefore,  by  an  argument  similar  to  that  yielding  Proposition  2  above, 
there  exists  a  T after  which  k  and  all  strategies  that  are  strongly  dominated 
in  the  smaller  game,  are  played  with  arbitrarily  small  probability,  and  so  on. 
This  proves  the following. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Zf p”  has full  support  and strategy  j  is  not  rationalizable, 
then for  any  n >  0,  there  is  a  T such  that  rj(p’,  L’)  <  n for  t >  T. 
s A  model  of  a  finite  population  with  heritable  mixed  strategies  was  introduced  by  Robson 
[24]  in  order  to  prove  that  the  set  of  evolutionary  stable  strategies  (ESS]  coincides  with  the 
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3.  HERITABLE  RULES 
The  previous  section  illustrated  that  evolutionary  outcomes  depend  on 
what  is  heritable:  Never-best  replies  cannot  survive  if mixed  strategies  can 
be  inherited,  but  might  survive  if  only  pure  strategies  can  be  inherited. 
Pure-strategy  and  mixed-strategy  inheritance  are  both  very  simple  rules;  it 
is easy  to  imagine  that  organisms  can  inherit  more  complicated  rules  than 
just  “play  strategy  s,”  or  “play  the  mixed  strategy  a,”  even  though  more 
complicated  rules  might  be “harder”  to  inherit  than  simpler  ones. Although 
we  do  not  know  how  to  rank  the  complexity  of  rules  in  terms  of 
heritability,  we  would  like  to  consider  more  complex  rules  than  in  the 
previous  section. 
An  interesting  class  of rules,  typical  of learning  models,  is  to  choose  a 
strategy  optimally  given  beliefs,  where beliefs  are  given  by  some  function  of 
the  history  of play.’  Learning  models  typically  take  the  distribution  of rules 
as  exogenously  given  and  focus  on  the  path  of  strategies  that  the  rules 
induce.”  We  find  the  evolutionary  perspective  provocative  in  that  it  gives 
a  framework  for  endogenizing  the  path  of  rules.’  ’  By  determining  which 
rules  survive,  evolution  can  shed light  on  the  vexing  problem  of how beliefs 
are  formed.  For  example,  does  evolution  select  for  Bayesian  updating 
starting  from  some  common  prior? 
A  general  analysis  of heritable  rules  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper. 
However,  we conclude  with  an  example  in  which  a  heritable  strategy  that 
never  is  a  best  reply  survives  even  if  some  players  inherit  the  apparently 
more  sophisticated  rule  “play  a  best  reply  to  the  distribution  of strategies 
last  period.”  This  rule  of  belief  formation  is  boundedly  rational  in  that 
players  do  not  account  for  the  fact  that  if everyone  obeys  that  rule,  the  dis- 
tribution  of strategies  in  the  current  period  will  differ  from  the  distribution 
last  period.  These  optimizers  are  a  special  case of the  boundedly  rational 
optimizers  in  the  learning  model  of  Milgrom  and  Roberts  [21],  whose 
result  implies  that  a population  of such optimizers  will  eventually  play  only 
rationalizable  strategies.  Since  we have  shown  that  never-best  replies  can 
9 Learning  models  include  Canning  [6],  Fudenberg  and  Kreps  [lo],  Fudenberg  and 
Levine  [ll],  Jordan  [lS],  and  Kalai  and  Lehrer  [19]. 
lo  In  addition  to  determining  the  strategies,  the  rules  may  also  endogenously  determine 
some  aspects  of  behavior.  For  example,  Fudenberg  and  Levine  [  111  adopt  the  exogenous 
assumption  that  players  are  rational  Bayesians  who  choose  strategies  optimally  and  calculate 
conditional  probabilities.  In  each  period  an  extensive  form  game  is  played,  so  that  these 
rational  players  will  optimally  decide  how  much  to  experiment  in  order  to  observe  their 
opponents’  strategies.  Thus  the  level  of  experimentation  is  endogenous. 
I’  Blume  and  Easley  [4]  provide  an  interesting  alternative  approach  to  endogenizing  rules: 
they  ask  which  investment  strategies  will  disappear  (own  a  vanishing  share  of  wealth)  and 
which  will  dominate  (own  a  positive  share  of  wealth  in  the  limit). 404  DEKEL  AND  SCOTCHMER 
survive  when  players  inherit  pure  strategies,  it  is  natural  to  ask  whether 
never-best  replies  can  survive  when  some  players  are  optimizers.  The 
following  extension  of  Example  1  shows  the  answer  is  yes.  Thus,  the 
existence  of boundedly  rational  optimizers  (with  naive  beliefs  as described 
above)  will  not  lead  to  the  extinction  of  even  more  naive  players,  and 
hence  rationalizable  strategies  are  not  guaranteed. 
EXAMPLE  2.  We  will  again  use  the  augmented  rock-scissors-paper 
game  described  above,  and  will  suppose  that  there  are  two  heritable  rules 
of  behavior:  Players  can  either  play  the  dominated  strategy  D  with 
probability  one  or  they  can  be  optimizers  in  the  sense we have  described. 
We  claim  that  the  replicator  dynamics  will  allow  both  strategies  to  persist 
in  equal  numbers. 
We  will  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  stationary  dynamic  path  in  which 
half  the  population  plays  D  every  period,  and  the  other  half  cycles  among 
strategies  A,  B, and  C.  First  suppose  the  path  begins  with  a  population  in 
which  half  the  population  plays  D  and  the  other  half,  who  are  optimizers, 
play  A.  Strategy  D yields  payoff  zero  if the  opponent  is  also  playing  D, but 
yields  payoff  1.1  if  the  opponent  is  an  optimizer,  since  optimizers  play  A, 
B, or  C.  Thus,  the  payoff  to  a  player  who  plays  D  is  (.5)(1.1)  =  .55.  An 
optimizer  gets  .l  if  the  opponent  is  playing  D,  which  occurs  with  proba- 
bility  .5,  and  gets  1  if  it  meets  another  optimizer  who  is  also  playing  A. 
Thus,  the  optimizer’s  payoff  is  also  .55.  In  the  following  period  the  payoffs 
will  again  be  .55  for  each  type  of player,  but  the  optimizers  will  all  play  B, 
which  is  the  best  reply  to  the  previous  population,  which  was playing  A 
and  D, each  with  probability  .5.  Since  the  two  strategies-playing  D  with 
probability  one  or  being  an  optimizer-always  have  the  same  payoff,  they 
will  continue  to  coexist  in  equal  numbers. 
Now  suppose  the  initial  population  has  more  than  half  optimizers  and 
fewer  than  half  D-players.  Then  the  probability  that  a  D-player  meets  an 
optimizer  is higher  than  when  they  are  equally  represented.  These  meetings 
will  favor  D-players,  who  get  payoff  1.1,  and  D-players  will  grow  faster 
than  optimizers  until  the  two  strategies  are  represented  in  equal  propor- 
tions.  A  symmetric  argument  shows  that  if  there  are  more  D-players  than 
optimizers,  D-players  will  grow  more  slowly.  Therefore  the  only  outcome 
of the  replicator  dynamics  is equal  proportions.  This  completes  the  presen- 
tation  of Example  2. 
Thus,  “optimizers”  might  be  no  more  successful  in  propagating  their 
genes than  naive  players  who  bequeath  genes for  playing  never-best  replies. 
This  example  also  demonstrates  the  sensitivity  of how one  models  “a  little 
bit  of irrationality”:  having  everyone  almost  rational  is not  robust  to  intro- 
ducing  a  small  group  of  very  simple-minded  players.  As  we have  shown, EVOLUTION  AND  OPTIMIZING  BEHAVIOR  405 
introducing  a few simple-minded  players  who  copy  their  parents’  never-best 
reply  can  destroy  the  conclusion  that  “sophisticated”  players  will  learn  to 
play  rationalizable  strategies  (Gul  [ 131,  Milgrom  and  Roberts  [21]). 
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